Abstract
Introduction

1.
Forensic evidence is now routinely used in the criminal justice process. The discriminatory power of forensic evidence like the use of forensic DNA analysis not only gives the authority an invaluable tool in identifying crime perpetrators but also makes it easier for the prosecution to prove the case against the accused.
However, one must not forget that forensic evidence falls within the matter which is outside the court's knowledge. Forensic analysis is conducted by an expert witness who will later present the result of the analysis in court. In Malaysia, forensic analysis on behalf of the prosecution is normally conducted either by experts from the Chemistry Department of Malaysia (CDM) or experts from the Royal Malaysia Police Forensic Laboratory (RMPFL). 1 One similarity between these experts is that all of them are government experts.
In reality, though it is not impossible, it is an uphill task for the defence to challenge the testimony given by government expert witnesses. This is due to the fact that the preferential treatment given by law and precedent to those experts. Only in rare occasion, the court would reject their testimony. One example can be seen in Public Prosecutor v Azman bin Ismail & Ors [2007] 3 MLJ 628 (HC) at para [48]-[49] , when the High Court rejected DNA evidence presented by the prosecution after finding that the expert witness who conducted the analysis was not a competent expert witness.
There are two main focusses of this article. First, it explains the preferential treatment given by law and precedent to government expert witnesses in Malaysia. As a result of the preferential treatment, it is not too far-fetched to suggest it is an easy task for the prosecution in Malaysia to prove the admissibility of expert evidence that it wishes to use during trials. Firstly, the evidence must be the one that requires special skill. Secondly, the person giving the evidence must be a qualified person. As can be seen in the above passage, the Court generally will examine his or her academic qualification to determine whether a person is an expert. However, the Supreme Court in the same case had also explained that the competency of government expert witness may be presumed without the need to enquire their qualification if the nature of expert evidence is an uncomplicated matter. We reproduce the judgment of the Court on this matter:
We were therefore of the opinion that since the evidence sought to be proved by the prosecution was limited only to serviceability of an ordinary revolver, Mr Cheong (PW6), a chemist in the chemistry department, was competent to give expert evidence of such an uncomplicated matter. In the circumstances of this case, the court was entitled to accept his position as a government chemist as sufficient, without going into his academic qualification or experience. ([1993] 3 MLJ 217 (SC) 
at p. 230) (emphasis added).
The above quotation shows that when the expert's testimony is confined to an uncomplicated matter, the court may accept expert evidence without examining his or her qualification or experience as an expert. It should be noted that the principle derived from the case is only applicable when the matter involved is uncomplicated.
Presumed to have Conducted Analysis in a Correct Manner
Apart from the presumption of their competency, illustration (e) of s 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 allows courts to presume that any forensic analysis conducted by the government expert witness has been conducted in a correct manner. Illustration (e) of s 114 states:
The Court may presume-(e) that judicial and official acts have been regularly performed;
This presumption was invoked by the High Court in Pendakwa Raya v Kek Leong Peng [1992] 3 CLJ (Rep) 234 (HC) at p. 237 when it was presumed that the government chemist who analysed a quantity of illicit drugs had taken the necessary precautions to ensure that the representative sample he removed was not tampered with in order to be able to carry out a correct analysis.
Testimony on Uncomplicated Matter Accepted on Its Face Value
Testimony of government expert witness may be accepted on its face value if it involves an "uncomplicated matter, when expert opinion confined only to the elementary nature and identity of a substance". This precedent is set by the Supreme 
How did it starts?
First of all, it is important to note that Munusamy was referred to and followed by three previous cases decided by the apex court as can be seen in Public Prosecutor v Lam San [1991] However, we argue that the judgment in these three cases with regard to expert witness must be viewed in the nature and context of expert evidence adduced in those cases. These three cases involved expert evidence on drug analysis. Drug analysis normally involves analysis as to the weight and the types of drugs. Thus, the applicability of the precedent set in Munusamy in these three cases can be regarded as appropriate and does not raise any concern.
An example where Malaysian courts are willing to accept testimony given by a government expert witness on its face value even when it involves complicated matters can be seen from what had transpired in Public Prosecutor v Muhammad Rasid bin Hashim [2011] 7 MLJ 845 (HC). When evaluating the government expert witness testimony on DNA evidence, the High Court at para [46] held that:
In the case of Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] 1 MLJ 492 [SC] learned Justice Mohd Azmi SCJ had said that unless the evidence of the chemist was inherently incredible or the defence called evidence in rebuttal by another expert to contradict the opinion, the court was entitled to accept the opinion of the expert on its face value. I had found that there was nothing inherently incredible about the evidence of SP8 on his findings on the DNA profiling on the specimens analysed by him. And I noted too that there was no serious challenge mounted by the defence on the methodology as employed by SP8 in the course of his DNA analysis and definitely there was no introduction by the defence of rebuttal evidence of another expert to contradict SP8's opinion. (emphasis added).
It is important to note that, the High Court in the above case also did not cite the original passage as per decided in Munusamy in full. It can be seen that the sentences which highlighted the condition when the expert witness testimony can be accepted on its face value was omitted by the Court. The question is can the precedent in Munusamy also be applied to the testimony of expert evidence regarding DNA analysis?
As explained earlier, the precedent in Munusamy with regard to accepting expert witness testimony on its face value should only apply when the testimony involves an uncomplicated matter. Due to the nature and the complexity in the process of DNA analysis, it is wrong to say that expert testimony on DNA analysis should also fall within that category. 2 In fact, the DNA analysis is much more complicated and complex compared to some examples of complicated matter given by the Court in Munusamy; the handwriting, trade mark, copy right or ballistic experts. Thus, it is submitted that the High Court in this case had not only failed to observe the doctrine of stare decisis 3 but also had modified the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Munusamy which it was bound to follow.
The Implication from the Federal Court's Judgment in the Sodomy II Trial
On 10th February 2015, the Federal Court delivered the judgment for the Sodomy II trial. Coincidentally, the testimony of government expert witnesses in this case also involved DNA evidence. The appellant in this case had challenged the DNA analysis conducted by government expert witnesses through gruelling cross-examination and by calling rebuttal expert evidence. Despite that, the Court was in favour of the testimony given by the government expert witnesses over the defence expert witnesses. After concluding that the evidence falls within the category of expert opinion (the first test in s 45 and as explained in Junaidi in the above), the Court made the following observation: 4
As regards the opinion of an expert, it was observed in Munusamy v Public Prosecutor [1987] Having considered the totality of the evidence, and having taken into consideration the above discussion we have no doubt that the appellant failed to discredit PW5 and PW6. There was nothing inherently incredible about PW5 and PW6's evidence.
As can be seen in above, the Federal Court like in Balachandran and Muhammad Rasid also omitted the portion which highlighted the circumstances when testimony of expert witnesses can be accepted on its face value as we mentioned earlier.
We argue that by using the phrase "As regards the opinion of an expert" as in the above and by not citing the passage in Munusamy in full, the Court has indirectly suggested that with regard to expert opinion, the current law in Malaysia is that the Malaysian courts are now willing to accept testimony given by government expert witness on its face value even when it involves complicated matter like DNA analysis 5 unless it is proven highly incredible or the defence calls evidence in rebuttal by another expert to contradict the opinion. In this respect, the court had thus deviated from the original precedent set in Munusamy.
It is important to note that Munusamy was decided by the Supreme Court, the apex court of the country at that time. The Sodomy II trial was decided by the Federal Court, which is the current apex court of the country. Being the current apex court of the country, the principle set by the Federal Court's judgment in the Sodomy II trial prevails, represents the current law on this issue and is bound to be followed by the lower courts. 6
Conclusion
4.
In this article, we argue that the Federal Court's judgment in the Sodomy II trial has indirectly set a new precedent with regard to expert witness evidence in Malaysia. Literal interpretation from the judgment suggests that courts are now willing to accept all types of expert evidence including forensic evidence adduced by government expert witnesses on its face value without the need to assess the nitty-gritty of how the analysis process was conducted. If this is the true intention of the court, we argue that this precedent would further add to the disadvantage of the defence in criminal trials.
Although in theory the defence may rebut prosecution expert evidence by exercising the trial safeguards given to them such as the right to cross-examination or calling rebuttal expert evidence, in reality, effective utilisation of these two 4 Dato' Seri Anwar Bin Ibrahim v Public Prosecutor 05-47-03/2014(W) rights are easier said than done. For example, cross-examination of an expert witness who testified on forensic evidence can only be effectively made if the defence lawyer also has sufficient knowledge on the subject matter. Without special training, the defence lawyer would be easily overpowered by the expert witness. 7 On the other hand, the right to call rebuttal expert evidence is only available to an accused who has strong financial sources (Van der Walt, 2001, p. 309) . It is highly improbable to expect an indigent accused would be able to get access to forensic expert to assist his or her case when it is an open secret in Malaysia that many accused cannot even afford to hire a lawyer to represent them during trials.
In addition, the latest precedent also increases the risk of accepting unreliable expert evidence during trials. It must be noted that the current admissibility rule in Malaysia does not require the party who would like to adduce expert evidence to prove "evidentiary reliability." As we explained earlier, there are only two tests that need to be satisfied as per s 45 of Evidence Act 1950. The reliability test is currently part of the tests that need to be fulfilled and adopted in other Common Law jurisdictions before expert evidence can be admitted. For example, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence in the United States not only requires the techniques used by expert evidence in the analysis must be proven as reliable but also requires the court to examine whether the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case (See also Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 509 US 579 (1993) at p. 593-594). Thus, courts should take an active role to assess the reliability of expert opinion before it can be admitted. To put it in another way, no expert evidence should be accepted on its face value.
